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Abstract. Claims that states which offer generous welfare benefits attract the poor and that some 
states pay low benefits intending to drive the poor away are neither uncommon nor entirely un- 
founded. This paper employs a two player (state) generalized game to model states' choice of a 
benefit level in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Migration by the 
poor in response to interstate differentials in earnings and welfare opportunities, and the subse- 
quent changes in AFDC caseloads, drive this game. 
Estimation of the model (using 1979 data) suggests that states within approximately 750 miles 
of each other do engage in a benefit-setting game. The rival's initial number of poor and preference 
for non-AFDC consumption appear to be the more influential rival characteristics. 
These findings, while derived from a different methodological approach, are consistent with 
previous studies which indicate that welfare recipients tend to move toward higher benefit states. 
Such migration may impede the efficient spatial allocation of labor. The results also indicate that 
states will tend to offer lower benefits given recipient migration than would be the case otherwise. 
State jurisdiction over benefits consequently leads to underprovision of AFDC. Federalization of 
the AFDC program would improve efficiency in terms of the spatial allocation of labor and the 
provision of AFDC. 
I. Introduction 
Observers of  welfare programs have frequently cautioned that generous 
benefits will attract additional recipients. A number of studies, for example 
Gramlich and Laren (1984) and Blank (1988) show that when the poor move, 
they are more likely to move to locations offering relatively higher benefits. 
Such migration could significantly affect states' welfare caseloads and thus to- 
tal program expenditures. Accordingly one might expect a state to anticipate 
the migration impact of  its benefit choice. 
Few studies formally model the potential feedback from recipient migration 
to average benefit levels. 1 Smith (1988) presents a model in which two states 
engage in a noncooperative AFDC benefit-setting game. Each bases its deci- 
sion on the impact of anticipated migration on total AFDC expenditures, tak- 
ing the earned and unearned income opportunities in the rival state as given. 
* Thanks to William Milberg, Herve Moulin, Stephen Sheppard and Richard Steinberg for their 
comments and suggestions. 
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This paper uses 1979 data to estimate and test the game theoretic model. The 
pattern of  benefits offered by states within at least 750 miles of  each other is 
consistent with the model's implications. The most influential of  the rival's 
characteristics is the number of poor: The more poor in the rival state, the low- 
er the selected AFDC benefit level, ceteris paribus. The rival's income and taste 
for non-AFDC goods also exhibit significant influence. 
Section 2 presents the model and its comparative static properties. Section 
3 proposes one method for defining " the  rival" and discusses other model 
specification issues. We then use Two Stage Least Squares to estimate the 
model. Section 4 summarizes the results and conclusions. 
2.  R e v i e w  o f  the  m o d e l  
Consider two states, each of which must decide how to allocate resources be- 
tween the provision of  a minimum living standard (the AFDC benefit level) and 
the provision of  all other publicly provided goods. Both the benefit level and 
the composite alternative can be assumed to be purely public goods without 
loss of  generality. We assume that each voter or legislator has single-peaked 
preferences over the benefit level, thus we model the "state 's  choice" as the 
maximization of a single utility function, that of  the median voter: 
m a x  U i = U ( C i , b i )  (1) 
subject to I i = C i + sibiTi(Pi + Gi(bi;bj)) 
where: 
P i  = 
I i = 
C i = 
b i = 
T i =  
S i = 
G i = 
initial number of  poor in state i; 
annual income of  state i, assumed exogenous; 
annual consumption of  all other goods in state i, C i _> 0. The price of 
this composite public good is normalized to unity; 
average annual AFDC benefit per recipient in state i; 
the probability of unemployment (being on AFDC) in state i; 
state i's share of the benefit ($1 - federal share); 
net migration from state j to state i. 
The inclusion of the net migration function (Gi) reflects that the state (or its 
voters) anticipates changes in the caseload due to migration induced by the 
chosen benefit level. Specifically, the marginal cost of  offering a $1 higher 
benefit will not generally be sibiTiP i. When recipients migrate, the marginal 
cost is instead sibiTi(P i + Gi): There is both a dollar cost and a caseload cost 
associated with changes in the benefit level. 
The migration function follows from each poor resident's migration deci- 
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sion. Fol lowing S jaas tad ' s  (1962) migra t ion-as -an- inves tment  model  and as- 
suming risk neutral i ty,  a poo r  resident will move  if doing so increases his or 
her expected income by  an a m o u n t  in excess o f  migra t ion  costs. Tha t  is: 
Migrate  to state j if: (Tjbj + (1 - Tj)Ej - Tib i - (1 - Ti)Ei) 
- cdij - Mi(n ) > 0 
(2) 
Stay in state i otherwise.  
Or  equivalently,  
Migrate  to state j if  Mi(n ) < ffl i (3) 
where 






= the probabi l i ty  of  u n e m p l o y m e n t  in state i,j; 
= average annual  earnings o f  a p o o r  resident o f  state i,j; 
= the cost o f  migra t ion  per mile; 
= the distance between states i and j, in miles; 2 
= the psychic cost o f  migra t ion  of  resident n o f  state i. 
To  keep the model  t ractable ,  we assume that  psychic costs (Mi(n)) are uni- 
fo rmly  distr ibuted over  each s ta te ' s  poor  with a m a x i m u m  of  Ki, j. The  p roba-  
bility that  a r andomly  selected poor  resident o f  state i will migra te  to state j is 
then ffli/K i for  ffa i > 0 and 0 otherwise.  State i can expect,  given its employ-  
ment  and demograph ic  characterist ics and those  o f  the rival,  that  a par t icular  
benefi t  level will induce ou t -migra t ion  in the amoun t :  
Mig(i--- j)  = max  {0,Pirhi/Ki} 
and in-migra t ion  in the amount :  
(5) 
M i g ( j - - i )  = max  {0,Pjffaj/Kj}. 
Net  migra t ion  is simply: 
(6) 
Gi(bi;bj) = M i g ( j - - * i ) -  M i g ( i - - j ) .  (7) 
G i is a cont inuous  non-negat ive  funct ion  in b i which can be divided into five 
distinct regions (Figure 1). In Region 4, state i pays  a benefi t  so high tha t  it at- 
t racts  all o f  state j ' s  poor .  In Region 5, state i offers  such a low benefi t  that  
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Figure 1. Net migration to state i as a function of its AFDC benefit. 
some residents to migrate,  while in Region 3 b i is high enough to attract  some 
o f  state j 's  poor .  Finally, as long as residents face positive migrat ion costs there 
is a range o f  benefits,  bi l°w to bi up, which induces no migration: 
bi l°w = {(1 - Tj)Ej - (1 - Ti)E i + Tjbj} - cdij (8) 
T i 
{(1 - Tj)Ej - (1 - Ti)E i + Tjbj} + cdij 
bi up = (9) 
T i 
Region 2, where the game is suspended,  is 2cdij /T i dollars wide. This range ex- 
pands as either distance (dij) or variable migrat ion costs (c) increase. This 
result implies that  AFDC benefit  compet i t ion will take place only within limit- 
ed geographic regions. States far  f rom each other ,  for  example Maine and Ari- 
zona,  set their respective benefit  levels independent ly  of  each other.  Also, 
recipient populat ions  which have high migrat ion costs, such as the ill or  disa- 
bled, are less likely to move in response to benefit  differentials.  Transfer  pro- 
grams targeted at these groups probably  will not  experience interstate benefit  
competi t ion.  
Suppose each state behaves as if it were maximizing a Cobb-Douglas  utility 
function:  
Ui(Ci,bi) = Ci3'i bi(l-'/i) (10) 
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Assuming that  U i is monotonic ,  the state's choice can be reduced f rom a 
pair (Ci,bi) to simply bi: 
Ui(bi,bj) = (I i - siTibi(P i + Gi(bi;bj)))~'i bi(1-'ri) (11) 
Because G i is cont inuous in b i and bj, U i is cont inuous in b i. Fur thermore ,  it 
can be shown that  if the choice set is convex, U i is quasi-concave in b i. If  the 
choice set is not  convex, U i may  not  be quasi-concave and equil ibrium may 
not  exist. Restricting our  at tention to the case o f  convex choice sets, the game 
with Cobb-Douglas  utility functions satisfies established condit ions for  exis- 
tence of  an equilibrium. 3 
Maximizing (11) with respect to b i yields the following first order  condit ion:  
0G i 
siT i bi(P i + 3,ibi + Gi) - (1 - "/i)Ii = 0. (12) 
0b i 
Solving (12) for  b i produces state i's react ion function: 
/ 0Gi (3'i - 1)Ii 
- (Pi + Gi) + (Pi + Gi) z - 4 "Yi 0b i siTi 
bi = (13) 
23, i 0Gi 
0b i 
G i is however a funct ion o f  b i. To  solve for  b i we must  substitute in the ap- 
propr ia te  region o f  the migrat ion function.  State i will accordingly have a reac- 
t ion funct ion comprised of  three parts, each describing the utility maximizing 
benefit  level given the migrat ion parameters  and the region. For  a given bj, 
state i will calculate the best response in each o f  Regions 1, 2, and 3 and will 
offer  the feasible best response which yields the highest utility. 
The simplest case is a Region 2 equilibrium, where there is no migration.  The 
first order  condit ion (12) reduces to: 
siTibiP i - (1 - Ti)Ii = O. (12 ' )  
The optimal  benefit  level, or best response, is b i 2  - 
(1 - 3,i)Ii 
siTiP i 
The comparat ive  static properties of  the equil ibrium benefit  can now be easily 
determined:  
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3bi2 0bi2 Obi2 Obi2 3bi2 
- - < 0 ,  > 0 ,  < 0 ,  < 0 ,  
03' i 3I i as i 3P i 3T i 
< 0 (14) 
The higher the Cobb-Douglas utility weight on non-AFDC consumption, the 
lower will be the equilibrium benefit. This suggests the intuitively obvious; 
states with lower preferences for poverty relief will offer lower average AFDC 
benefits. Second, the higher the state's income, the higher the benefit it will 
offer - the income effect for normal goods. Third, the lower is the state's share 
(the higher is the federal share), the higher will be the benefit level offered - 
the standard price response. Fourth, the greater the state's number of poor, 
and thus the higher the marginal caseload price of b i, the lower will be the 
equilibrium benefit. This again is a standard price response. Finally, the higher 
the probability of unemployment, the lower will be the benefit level because 
more residents will depend on AFDC; i.e., the caseload price is higher. None 
of the rival's characteristics influence bi: When there is no migration each 
state acts as a fully independent maximizing agent. 
In Region 4, where all of state j 's poor migrate to i, the first order condition is: 
siTibi(P i + Pj) - (1 - yi)Ii = O, (12") 
(1  - 3,i)Ii 
and the optimal benefit level is bia - . The same comparative 
siTi(P i + Pj) 
Obi4 
static results hold as in Region 2 and in addition: - -  < 0. The more poor 
aPj 
in the rival state (thus the greater the caseload price), the lower will be the 
equilibrium benefit level. 
In Regions 1 and 3 migration occurs and the states play the generalized game. 
Consequently migration costs and the rival's characteristics influence the 
AFDC benefit choice. Substituting (5) into (13) produces state i's best Region 
1 (out-migration) response: 
1 
- Pi(1 - Ki ((1-Tj)Ej - (1-Ti )E i + Tjbj) - cdij) 
b i = + 
Pi 
2 T i (1 + Yi) 
K i (15) 
• ~ / p 2  (1 - ((1-Tj)Ej - (1-Ti)E i + Tjbj) - cdij) 2 - 4 
1 P__L ('ri + 1)(y i -  1)I i 
K i Ki s i 
2 Pi Ti (l+Yi) 
K i 
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Substituting (6) into (13) produces state i's best Region 3 (in-migration) res- 
ponse: 
Pj 
- (Pi + - ~ j  ((1-Ti)E i - (1-Tj)Ej  - Tjbj) - cdij ) 
b i =  + 
Pj 
2 T i (1 + Yi) 
Kj 
(16) 
P j  . . . .  m Pj + 1)(7 i -  1)I i ~ / ( P i  + ((1 -Ti)E i (1 -Tj)Ej Tjbj) cdij): 4 
Kj Kj s i 
2 Pj T i (l+3q) 
Kj 
The rival's reaction functions for Region 1 and 3 can be similarly derived and 
are likewise complex. 
To solve for state i's equilibrium benefit level, assuming it exports recipients 
to state j, substitute j 's  best " impor t "  response into (15) and solve for b i. Con- 
versely, substituting (16) into j 's  best "expor t"  response produces state j 's 
equilibrium benefit level, given that it imports recipients. Because each state's 
"regional" reaction function is quite complex, these substitutions produce 
very lengthy and complicated expressions for which apparently no closed-form 
solution can be derived. 
We simulate the AFDC benefit game through an iterative search routine. 4 
The game begins with bj = 0, to which state i makes the utility maximizing 
response. The program determines this response by calculating state i's three 
regional best responses to bj = 0. State i plays the regional best response for 
which the highest utility obtains. State j 's "global"  best response is then calcu- 
lated similarly. This process continues until the sign of the difference in con- 
secutive bi's reverses. This indicates that the search routine has past the point 
of intersection of the states' best response functions. The program then begins 
a convergence routine which locates the intersection (equilibrium) within 
$0.001. The program also determines the pattern of migration and checks the 
convexity of state i's budget constraint at equilibrium. The exogenous values 
employed all lie within the range of  levels observed in 1979. 
Previous studies typically find that the larger a state's poor population, the 
lower on average are the state's welfare benefits (e.g., Orr, 1976). The model 
simulations also indicate an inverse relationship between the number of poor 
and the average benefit level. This result obtains because the greater the num- 
ber of poor, the greater is the marginal cost of increasing the benefit level. 
The model also implies that a state responds to the number of poor in the 
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rivalstate. Specifically, the larger the number of poor  in the rival state, the low- 
er will be the state's own equilibrium benefit. A state recognizes that offering 
a benefit level which induces the in-migration of even a small fraction of  the 
rival's poor can mean a large absolute increase in its AFDC caseload. Thus, 
a state sets a lower benefit than would be the case if its rival's poor population 
were smaller. 
Simulations of the impact of  changes in state income indicate that the higher 
the state's income, the higher on average is its AFDC benefit. This result simply 
reflects the income effect for normal goods and is common in the literature. 
The model further predicts that the higher the rival state's income, the higher 
will be the state's own benefit. A higher rival state income implies a higher rival 
state benefit. A state can then raise its own benefit without attracting as many 
of  the rival's poor.  
The simulations indicate that the current federal matching program has a 
positive effect on a state's choice of  benefits: The higher the federal share (the 
lower the state's share), the higher is the state's equilibrium benefit. This impli- 
cation is consistent with findings by Pogue and Sgontz (1968), Orr (1976), and 
Craig and Inman (1985). The model also implies that the higher the federal 
share paid to the rival state, the higher will be the state's own equilibrium 
benefit. The higher the federal share in the rival state, the higher the rival's 
benefit level and the smaller the expected gain from migration. Consequently 
the caseload price is lower and the state offers a higher benefit. Conversely, 
lowering either state's federal share will lower state i's benefit level. A nation- 
wide cut in federal support will thus have not one, but two depressing effects 
on the benefit level in each state. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the simulations for the remaining para- 
meters. The higher the average earnings of the poor in a state, tke lower will 
be the equilibrium benefit. Conversely, the higher the average earnings of the 
poor in the rival state, the higher will be the equilibrium benefit. These com- 
parative statics conform to the emerging pattern: Any characteristic which 
makes a state more attractive raises the caseload price and thus lowers the 
equilibrium benefit. Characteristics which make the rival more attractive lower 
the caseload price, raising the equilibrium benefit. 
The effect of  the state's unemployment rate on the equilibrium benefit level 
is ambiguous. This indeterminacy arises because T i exerts two opposing pres- 
sures on the AFDC caseload price. First, a lower unemployment rate will at- 
tract the poor,  raising the caseload price and lowering b i. Second, a lower T i 
will reduce the likelihood that a resident will join the AFDC rolls, reducing the 
caseload price and raising b i. 
The effect of the variable costs of  migration and distance are similarly in- 
determinant. The greater the cost per mile of  migration and the greater the dis- 
tance to the rival, the less likely are a state's residents to out-migrate. Thus, 
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Table 1. Compara t ive  statics o f  migrat ion equil ibrium 
0b i 0b i 
State income,  Ii, j 0Ii > 0 0Ij > 0 
ab i ab i 
P o o r  populat ion,  Pi,j OPi < 0 OPj < 0 
0b i 0b i 
Cobb-Douglas  preference < 0 < 0 
for other  expenditure,  aTi ¢~'j 
7i,j 0b i 0b i 
Average earnings,  El, j 0El < 0 aEj > 0 
abj < Obj < 
Probabi l i ty  of  unemployment ,  > 0 > 0 
Ti,j aT i OTj 
ab i 0b i 
Federal matching share > 0 > 0 
(1 - Si,j) a(l - si) a(1 - sj) 
abi > 
Cost  o f  migrat ion,  < 0 
ac per mile, c 
abi > 
Distance to rival, dij Odij < 0 
the higher are c and d, the greater the caseload price of  the benefit level. 
However, the higher are c and d, the less likely are the rival's poor to in- 
migrate, lowering the caseload price. A priori, there is no reason to expect one 
effect to dominate the other. 
Finally, the greater the Cobb-Douglas utility weight on other consumption 
(7i), the lower the state's equilibrium benefit level: States which prefer other 
consumption to the provision of  some minimum income level for the poor offer 
lower AFDC benefit levels. The model also implies that the higher is the rival's 
utility weight on other consumption, the lower is the state's own benefit level, 
otherwise more of the rival's poor will be attracted. 
The simulated comparative statics appear quite robust. First, the equilibrium 
benefits (bi*, bj*) vary by only a few cents when the starting value varies from 
$0 to $1000. Second, the indicated direction of  change in hi* for a change in 
a given parameter does not vary when different exogenous values are used (ex- 
cept for T, c, and dij, as expected). The exact values selected were chosen so 
as to generate in-migration, out-migration, and no-migration equilibria. Fur- 
thermore, equilibria in which the budget set is convex and nonconvex resulted. 
In summary, the simulated comparative statics hold regardless of the exo- 
genous values used, the direction of migration, or the shape of  the budget con- 
straint. 
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3. Empirical tests 
The two-state game theoretic model provides numerous testable implications. 
The major econometric challenge is to construct tests of these implications us- 
ing forty-eight state data. One way is to structure the data so that each observa- 
tion consists of a state's AFDC benefit level, its migration parameters, the 
migration parameters of another state (the rival), and the distance between the 
two states. For example, the average benefit level, unemployment rate, average 
earnings of the poor, et cetera, for Virginia would be paired with those varia- 
bles (except the benefit level) for Maryland, along with the distance between 
Virginia and Maryland. Constructed in this fashion, each observation captures 
the benefit competition between two states. 5 
The question now is, which pairs of states ought to be considered as rivals? 
One can easily imagine contiguous states engaged in a benefit-setting game, so 
a data set composed of pairs of contiguous states seems appropriate. The poor 
do, however, migrate between nonbordering states, indicating that the con- 
tiguity criterion may be too restrictive. As the model itself does not imply a 
specific definition of rivalrous pairs, we examine various data sets. The base 
data set consists of all possible state pairs. We create other data sets by subset- 
ting the base by distance between the states. 
The model implies that a complex nonlinear relationship exists between the 
AFDC benefit level and the independent variables. Furthermore, a closed-form 
solution for the "global"  best response apparently can not be analytically der- 
ived: There is no structural equation to which nonlinear estimation techniques 
can be applied. However, the "global"  best response function can be charac- 
terized as an implicit function. This implicit function would be locally continu- 
ous and differentiable so it can be linearly approximated (locally) using a first 
order Taylor Series expansion. We estimate the following simple linear benefit 
function: 
b i = ao + aa(1-Ti)  + a2 EARNi + a3 7i + a4Ii + as(1-si)  + 
a6P i + a7(1-Tj) + a8EARN j + a93~ j + aloI j + a l l (1-s j )  
+ a12Pj + a13DIST + e i. 
(17) 
The random error (ci) is assumed to be normally distributed. 6 
We can measure EARN by a variety of statistics. In 1979 females headed the 
majority of AFDC families, suggesting that the earnings of poor female- 
headed households (FEi,j) would be appropriate. Nearly twenty percent of 
AFDC recipient families were headed by males however. Male earnings may 
also influence the migration decision so we also estimate the model using the 
average earnings of all poor families (Ei,j). Also, AFDC recipients may re- 
spond to differences in the actual purchasing power of earnings rather than 
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to nominal earnings. We use a state consumer price index to convert both nomi- 
nal earnings measures, E and FE, into real terms, RE and RFE respectively. 7 
We omit three variables in the theoretical model from (17). The cost of 
migration per mile (c) is omitted as it does not vary significantly over the sam- 
pie, it simply scales distance. Next, the maximum values of  the psychic cost dis- 
tributions (K i and Kj) are assumed to be constant and equal over all states. We 
make this assumption because estimation of psychic costs for even one group 
of potential migrants is beyond the scope of  this study, s 
The model is, of  course, sensitive to the assumed form of  the utility function. 
If  one assumes that each state maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
without error, then each state will set the share of its total expenditures allocat- 
ed to non-AFDC items (3'i) as follows: 
I i - bisiTi(Pi + Gi(bi;bj))  
3'i = (18) 
I i 
Since the current 3'i is related to the current benefit level we use a lagged value 
of  this expenditure share as an instrument. If  states optimize with error or if 
state preferences are not consistent with the Cobb-Douglas specification, the 
non-AFDC expenditure share will measure 3'i with error. As a consequence, 
least squares estimation will produce biased and inconsistent estimates. 
In light of  the potential errors in variables problem, one might consider mak- 
ing the assumption that preferences do not vary across states. The preference 
parameters 3'i and ~j would then be constants, not regressors. If preferences 
are constant, least squares estimation of (17) excluding 3'i and 3'j will produce 
unbiased, consistent estimates. However, if preferences vary across states this 
specification omits relevant variables. OLS estimates will be biased and incon- 
sistent (unless q/i and 3'j are perfectly orthogonal to the other regressors). Be- 
cause it is impossible to determine a priori which assumption is more realistic 
we run regressions based on each. The results do not differ significantly, so we 
report only the regressions which include the preference parameters. 
The final specification issue concerns the state's share, s i. The federal 
matching schedules for AFDC cause the state share and the benefit level to be 
simultaneously related (see Moffitt ,  1984). To control for this simultaneity we 
formulate the model as a system of  three equations: 
b i = a 0 + a l ( 1 - T j )  + a z E A R N  i + a3"/i + a4I i + a s ( 1 - s i )  + a6P i 
+ a 7 ( 1 - T  j) + asEARN j + aloI j + a l l ( 1 - s  j) + al2P j + 
a13DIST + e i l  (19) 
( 1 -  si) = /30 + / 31TOTPOPi  + /32Ii + /33bi + ei2 (20) 
(1 - s j )  = 60 + 61TOTPOP j + 62I j + 63b j + ej3 (21) 
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Table 2. 2 S L S  u s i n g  a l l  s t a t e  p a i r s  
E q .  V a r i a b l e  P a r a m e t e r  e s t i m a t e s  
b i  I N T  1 2 6 7 . 5 6 " *  2 7 7 . 1 7 "  - 9 9 3 . 7 0 * *  
(1 - Ti)  ( + / - )  5 8 7 9 . 7 2 * *  1 9 6 2 . 5 4 " *  3 0 5 4 . 5 6 * *  
E i ( - )  - 0 . 3 5 5 6 * *  
F E i  ( - ) 
R E  i ( - )  - 0 . 3 5 5 4 * *  
R F E  i ( - ) - 0 . 4 5 4 8 * *  
P i  ( - ) - 0 . 0 0 0 3 * *  - 0 . 0 0 0 0 8 * *  - 0 . 0 0 0 0 6 * *  
"Yi ( - )  - 6 4 3 2 . 8 5 * *  - 1 8 2 2 . 6 6 ' *  - 1 3 3 2 . 9 0 " *  
I i ( + ) 0 . 0 2 2 * *  
R I  i ( + )  0 . 0 1 9 8 " *  0 . 0 1 9 1 " *  
(1 - si) ( + ) 2 0 6 6 . 4 1  ** 5 7 5 . 3 3 " *  3 1 9 . 1 6 " *  
(1 - T j )  ( + / - )  1 5 3 . 1 4  7 2 . 7 1  17 .35  
Ej  ( + )  0 . 0 0 1 9  
F E j  ( + )  
R E j  ( + ) 0 . 0 0 0 4  
R F E j  ( + ) 0 . 0 0 1 5  
P j  ( - ) 0 . 0 0 0 0 3  * 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 4  6 . 2 8  E - 07  
3'j ( - ) - 6 8 . 5 3  - 3 4 . 2 9  - 12 .86  
Ij ( + ) - 0 . 0 0 2 6  
RI j  ( + ) - 0 . 0 0 0 7  - 0 . 0 0 0 2  
(1 - s j )  ( + )  - 1 5 2 . 3 8  1 .33  1 .13  
D I S T  ( + / - ) 0 . 0 7 0 2 * *  0 . 0 1 2 9 " *  0 . 0 0 2 5  
R2 = . 5509**  R2 = . 6877**  ~2 = . 8 0 1 2 " *  
(1  - s i)  I N T  0 . 8 1 9 4 " *  0 . 8 4 4 6 * *  0 . 8 1 7 2 " *  
T O T P O P  i ( + )  - 2 . 5 1 E - 0 8 " *  - 3 . 1 5 E - 0 8 " *  - 2 . 8 2 E - 0 8 " *  
I i ( -- ) 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 * *  
RI i  ( - )  0 . 0 0 0 0 8 ' *  0 . 0 0 0 0 7 ' *  
b i ( - ) - 0 . 0 0 0 2 " *  
R b  i ( - ) - 0 . 0 0 0 6 * *  - 0 . 0 0 0 5 * *  
R~ = . 4676**  R2 = 5028**  ~2 = . 4826**  
(1 - Sj) I N T  0 . 8 1 9 4 " *  0 . 8 4 4 6 * *  0 . 8 1 7 2 " *  
T O T P O P j  ( + )  - 2 . 5 1 E - 0 8 " *  - 3 . 1 5 E - 0 8 " *  - 2 . 8 2 E -  0 8 " *  
Ij ( - ) 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 * *  
RI j  ( - ) 0 . 0 0 0 8 * *  0 . 0 0 0 0 7 * *  
bj  ( - ) - 0 . 0 0 0 2 * *  
R b j  ( - ) - 0 . 0 0 0 6 * *  - 0 . 0 0 0 5 * *  
~2  = . 4676**  R2 = . 5028**  ~2 = . 4826**  
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  9 0 %  level .  
** S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  95070 level .  
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Table 3.2SLS using cont iguous state pairs 
Eq.  Variable Parameter  estimates 
bi INT 2191.97 - 1428.31 812.76 
( 1 - T  0 ( + / - )  6467.18"* 7693.99** 2326.13"* 
E i ( - )  - 0.2974** 
FE i ( - )  - 0.5950** 
RE i ( - )  - 0.3457** 
RFEi ( - ) 
Pi ( - )  -0 .0004**  -0 .0003**  - 0.0001"* 
"Yi (--) -5617 .64"*  -2943.40** - 1509.66"* 
I i ( + ) 0.032** 0.0285** 
RI i ( + ) 0.0292** 
(1  - Si) ( + ) 2802.72** 1262.84" 891.57** 
(1 - Tj) ( + / - )  -946 .51  -830 .74  -8 6 4 .1 9  
Ej ( + )  - 0 . 055  
FEj ( + ) - 0.0933 
RE i ( + )  -0 .0411 
RFEj ( + ) 
Pj ( - )  -0 .0003**  -0 .0001"*  -0 .00005** 
7j (--) -2443 .17"*  -691 .78  -519 .78  
lj ( + ) 0.0087 0.0078 
RIj ( + ) 0.0014 
(1 - s j )  ( + )  927.33 547.91 53.01 
DIST ( + / - ) 0.2780"* 0.0872 0.0417 











-220 .19  
0.0028 
23.30 
-0 .0205  
Rz = .7408** 
(1  - s i )  INT 0.8320** 0.7986** 0.8500** 
T O T P O P  i ( + )  - 2 . 5 7 E - 0 8 " *  - 2 . 1 4 E - 0 8 " *  - 3 . 0 9 E - 0 8 " *  
I i ( - ) 0.00002** 0.00002** 
RI i ( - ) 0.00008** 
b i ( - )  - 0.0002** - 0.0002** 
Rb i ( - ) - 0.0006** 
R2 = .4726** ~2 = .4537** R2 = .4872** 
0.8260** 
- 2 . 8 1 E - 0 8 " *  
0.00007** 
-0 .0005**  
R2 = .4779 
(1  - s j )  INT 0.8279** 0.7967** 0.8465** 
TOTPOPj  ( + )  - 2 . 5 2 E - 0 8 " *  - 2 . 1 2 E - 0 8  - 3 . 0 5 E - 0 8 ' *  
Ij ( - )  0.00002** 0.0002** 
RIj ( - )  0.00007** 
bj ( - )  -0 .0002**  -0 .0002**  
Rbj ( - )  -0 .0006**  
R2 = .4643** R2 = .4470** RZ = .4803** 
0.8240** 
- 2 . 7 8 E  - 08** 
0.00007** 
-0 .0005**  
R2 = .4717"* 
* Significant at 90o70 level. 
** Significant at 95o70 level. 
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where TOTPOP i is the total population of state i. 9 
Equation (19) will be just identified if/~1 and ~I are significantly different 
from zero. Equations (20) and (21) will be overidentified under a variety of res- 
trictions; e.g., oql and 62 not equal to zero. 1° Table 2 presents the Two State 
Least Squares (2SLS) estimates of the system using the all possible state pairs 
data set. 
All three regressions explain a significant proportion of the variation in b i. 
Most of the coefficients on the state's own characteristics are statistically sig- 
nificant and of the predicted sign. In particular, the federal share is positive 
and significant as predicted. The rival's characteristics are not significant. This 
result obtains due to the large distances between states in this data set. Distance 
is positive and significant in two of the regressions, suggesting that states are 
more concerned with in-migration than the ability to export the poor. 
Next we estimate this same system using only contiguous state pairs (Table 
3). All four regressions explain significant proportions of  the variation in 
benefits. All of the state's own characteristics are statistically significant and 
of the expected sign in the benefit equation. The number of poor in the rival 
state (Pj) exerts a significant negative impact in three of the regressions and the 
rival's utility weight on non-AFDC expenditure is significantly negative in one. 
The rival's characteristics do seem to matter (i.e., states play the benefit-setting 
game) when we consider contiguous states as rivals. 
Estimation of the system using states pairs within 750 miles of each other in- 
dicates that at this distance the rival's characteristics are somewhat significant 
factors in a state's benefit choice (Table 4).11 In all regressions the state's own 
characteristics are all statistically significant and of the predicted sign. When 
we use the earnings of all poor families, nominal or real, to measure average 
earnings, the size of the rival's poor population is also significant and negative, 
as predicted. There is also evidence, though weaker, that the rival's taste for 
non-AFDC goods influences the state's benefit choice. When we use real earn- 
ings of poor female-headed households, none of the rival's characteristics ap- 
pear significant. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This paper estimated and tested a noncooperative game model of AFDC benefit 
determination. The model explicitly accounts for both the impact of benefit 
differentials on migration and the impact of migration on a state's choice of 
benefit levels. The empirical analysis generally supports the model's many im- 
plications. First, the greater the distance between the states, the less likely there 
is to be interdependent behavior. The regressions suggest that a rival state more 
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Table 4. 2 S L S  us ing  s t a t e  p a i r s  w i t h i n  750 mi l e s  
E q .  V a r i a b l e  P a r a m e t e r  e s t i m a t e s  
bi  I N T  3 4 5 1 . 0 1 " *  1094 .51"*  - 1418 .82"*  
(1 - T i) ( + / - ) 5011 .07**  1640.51 ** 3 5 6 9 . 2 t * *  
E i ( - )  - 0 . 5 1 " *  
FEi ( - ) 
R E  i ( - ) - 0 .5363**  
R F E  i ( - ) - 0 .5294**  
Pi  ( - ) - 0 .0003**  - 0 .00007**  - 0 .00006**  
"~i ( - ) - 7 5 1 8 . 8 6 " *  - 1920 .00"*  - 1651.20** 
I i ( + )  0 .0286**  
R I  i ( + ) 0 . 0 3 1 4 " *  0 .026**  
(1 - si) ( + )  3 1 8 0 . 4 " *  1 1 2 6 . 4 2 ' *  670 .43**  
(1 - T j )  ( + / - )  416 .70  - 4 3 5 . 4 8  76.41 
Ej ( + )  - 0 .0358  
FEj  ( + ) 
REj  ( + ) - 0 .008  
R F E j  ( + ) - 0 .029  
p j  ( - ) - 0 .0002**  - 0 .00003**  - 0 .000001  
yj  ( - ) - 1483.79** - 96.31 53.81 
Ij ( + )  0 .0085  
RI j  ( + ) 0 .0023 0 .0012  
(1 - s j) ( + ) 1094 .30  43 .73  15.66 
D I S T  ( + / - )  - 0 . 0 4 2 9  - 0 . 0 1 7  - 0 . 0 0 7  
R~ = .4681"*  R2 = .5963** R2 = .7083** 
(1  - s i) I N T  0 .8370**  0 .8578**  0 .8298**  
T O T P O P  i ( + )  - 2 . 5 2 E -  08"*  - 3 . 0 4 E -  0 8 " *  - 2 . 7 3 E -  08"*  
I i ( - )  0 .00002**  
R I  i ( - ) 0 .00007**  0 .00006**  
b i ( - ) - 0 .0002**  
R b  i ( - ) - 0 .0006**  - 0 .0005**  
R2 = .5476** R~ = .5626** R2 = .5347** 
(1  - s j )  I N T  0 .837**  0 .8578**  0 .8298**  
T O T P O P j  ( + ) - 2 . 5 2 E  - 08** - 3 . 0 4 E  - 08** - 2 . 7 3 E  - 08** 
Ij ( - ) 0 .00002**  
RI j  ( - ) 0 .00007**  0 .00006**  
bj ( - ) - 0 .0002**  
Rbj  ( - ) - 0 .0006**  - 0 .0005**  
R2 = .5476** R2 = .5626** R2 = .5347** 
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  9 0 %  level .  
** S ign i f i c an t  a t  9 5 %  level .  
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than  750 miles away does not  exert significant  inf luence on  a state 's benefi t  de- 
cision. 
Benefit levels of states within 750 miles are consistent with competit ive 
benefi t-set t ing behavior.  Most  notably,  the larger the n u m b e r  of poor  in the 
rival state, the lower the state 's  benefi t  level. The rival state 's income and taste 
for n o n - A F D C  goods exhibit positive and negative impacts respectively. These 
results ob ta in  when we measure potent ial  earnings as either nomina l  or real 
earnings of all poor  families or as nomina l  earnings of  poor  female-headed 
households.  When  we measure potent ia l  earnings as real earnings of  poor  
female-headed households,  the significance of  rival state characteristics dis- 
sipates. 
While the methodological  approach employed here differs f rom that of  
previous analyses, the results are consistent  with earlier f indings that  A F D C  
recipients tend to migrate f rom lower to higher benefi t  states. Such recipient 
migra t ion  could impede the efficient spatial a l locat ion of labor.  
The results also indicate that  states will offer lower benefits,  on  average, 
given recipient mobi l i ty  than  they would otherwise. That  is, as long as 
recipients are mobile ,  state jur isdic t ion over benefi t  levels will lead to under-  
provis ion of AFDC.  Migrat ing recipients const i tute a spillover between states, 
thus opt imal  provision of  A F D C  requires federal jur isdict ion.  
Notes 
1. Gramlich (1982) is a notable exception. 
2. Distance is measured as miles between the states' largest SMSAs. If a state has two SMSAs, 
neither one being twice as large as the other, the average of the distances from both is used. 
3. Debren (1982) shows that if: (a) for every player the set of potential strategies is non-empty, 
compact, and convex; (b) if the pay-off function is continuous on the space of jointly potential 
strategies and quasi-concave in own strategy; and (c) if the correspondence defining the set of 
feasible strategies is continuous and convex-valued then the game has an equilibrium. 
4. A copy of the program is available upon request. 
5. The regressions were also run using a composite rival. This rival was constructed as a weighted 
average of the information from all other states. The weights were inversely related to distance. 
The results were similar, with the exception of increased collinearity. 
6. A description of the data and sources is available from the author upon request. 
7. The state consumer price index was constructed by Steven G. Craig and Robert P. Inman and 
used in their 1985 NBER paper. 
8. For an example of such estimation see Deaton, Morgan, and Anschel (1982). 
9. According to the matching formula, the federal share (1 - si) is a decreasing function of state 
income and an increasing function of state population. 
10. For the model omitting "gi and 3'j, the order conditions are met and all three equations are 
overidentified given similar restrictions. 
11. In regressions using states within 1000 miles and within 2000 miles of each other none of the 
rival's characteristics prove significant. 
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